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Introduction
Reserves grew quickly and condence returned. Maybe this is what made us miss the opportunity to review the exchange rate issue in the rst months of 1998, when it might have been possible to do it. (Cardoso, 2006) 1 The transition from an exchange rate crawling peg to the ination targeting regime with oating exchange rates was the most signicant monetary policy change in Brazil since the Plano Real in 1994.
The change occurred during a troubled period, after a sequence of international crises, 2 an agreement with the IMF, and presidential elections in October 1998. After a marked devaluation of the Real in January 1999, followed by an increase in ination in the short run, the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) increased interest rates to 45% p.a., in an attempt to keep ination expectations from unanchoring.
Subsequently, the CBB began to operate under the ination targeting regime, made ocial in June,
1999.
Changes to the exchange rate peg, including the possibility of abandoning that regime, were the subject of unending debates while it lasted. Even the adoption of ination targeting with oating exchange rates was not enough to put an end to that debate. Would it have been possible and desirable to keep the exchange rate pegged? What would have happened if the change in regime had occurred earlier? What would have been the most favorable moment for such change?
In this paper we answer some of these questions using a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model (DSGE) based on Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) , estimated for the Brazilian economy. The model is estimated using macroeconomic data from the third quarter of 1995 to the second quarter of 2013. Following Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) , we explicitly model the change of monetary regime that took place in the rst quarter of 1999. To that end, we allow the coecients of the interest rate rule followed by the CBB to vary across regimes. In particular, with the adoption of ination targeting the CBB ceases to react to deviations of the nominal exchange rate from a pre-stablished parity, and starts to react to deviations of ination from target. For the sake of simplicity, the change of regime comes as a surprise to economic agents. The other parameters of the model, related to preferences, technology etc., are assumed to be invariant.
We use the estimated model to recover the structural shocks that hit the Brazilian economy during the sample period, and simulate counterfactual histories. Specically, we analyze the eects of alternative timings for the adoption of ination targeting with oating exchange rates.
Before we summarize our main results, a few observations are in order. In any exercise of this kind, 1 Originally in Portuguese: Rapidamente as reservas cresceram e a conança voltou. Talvez tenha sido isso que nos levou a perder oportunidades para rever a questão cambial no primeiro quadrimestre de 1998, quando eventualmente teria sido possível fazê-lo. Our own translation.
2 Asian Crisis in 1997 and Russian Crisis in 1998. 2 the results and conclusions must be seen as conditional on the details of the model, data and estimation method used. For our purposes, the caveats associated with the model are particularly important.
The estimated model may be suitable for studying aggregate uctuations and questions related to macroeconomic stabilization policies. However, it is silent on any issue that pertains to the long run. This is so because there is no channel in the model through which policies may aect trend growth. Hence, the model should only be used to address questions that can be circumscribed to business cycle frequencies.
As in most of the literature, we work with an approximation of the model around a zero ination steady state. However, during our sample period the Brazilian economy faced important shocks, including the monetary regime change itself. In future work, it would be interesting to review the points made in this paper using methods that preserve the non-linearity of the model. Additionally, it would be advisable to allow for trend ination, so as to bring the steady state of the model closer to the data.
The hypothesis that the parameters of the economy other than those of the monetary policy rule are invariant (structural) is inherent to the idea that the model is well specied and immune to the Lucas Critique. This hypothesis can be tested econometrically and, if rejected, the model specication can be changed. 3 Similarly, we could consider a model with alternating monetary regimes, with transition probabilities that are understood by economic agents. This would allow us to incorporate expectations of changes in the exchange rate regime, which certainly existed to varying degrees before the adoption of a oating exchange rate in January 1999. 4
The questions that we nd most relevant pertain to the viability of the monetary policies used in some of the counterfactual histories notably the one that simulates the continuation of the exchange rate crawling peg regime. In the model, sticking to this regime is always a viable option. There are no political pressures, condence crises, speculative attacks, nor loss of international reserves. 5 In reality, one can argue that the defense of a currency peg is simply not viable in certain circumstances. Incorporating the role of limited foreign exchange reserves and speculative attacks in such a DSGE model is an interesting avenue for research, which, as far as we know, remains unexplored.
The discussion in the previous paragraph brings us to the most important caveat, which pertains to scal policy something that the model essentially abstracts from. One may reasonably argue 3 Another option would be to allow for changes in some structural parameters. Despite the fact that this route seems to violate the spirit of the Lucas Critique, there is evidence that some parameters usually taken to be structural can vary over time in an important manner (e.g., Guiso et al. 2013) . It is worth mentioning that this type of evidence is not in conict with the essence of the Lucas Critique. 4 These expectations can be explicitly modeled as in Davig and Leeper (2010) , who introduce a Markov switching monetary policy rule in the basic new Keynesian model. However, for a rst exercise approaching the questions in this paper and taking into consideration that our analysis is based on quarterly data the assumption of a surprise change in the monetary regime may be less problematic than it seems at rst. 5 The reader who is not familiar with the recent literature in Monetary Economics may nd it surprising that the model assumes a cashless economy. In this respect, we follow the approach advocated by Woodford (2003) , to which we refer the readers who wish to deepen their understanding of the topic. that the pressure to oat the Real resulted largely from a perception that Brazil's scal policy was unsustainable. This would have imposed limits to monetary policy and rendered the defense of the currency peg impossible. This issue can be addressed in a model with relevant interactions between monetary and scal policies possibly with regime shifts applicable to both of them. In that context, it would be natural to assume that the risk premium associated with foreign indebtedness depends on the country's scal position. As a result, the structural shocks recovered from the estimated model could change signicantly, leading to important dierences in some of the counterfactual histories that we construct (more on that latter).
With those caveats in mind, let us move to the results. As expected, the estimated parameters for the crawling peg regime indicate that monetary policy was geared towards the maintenance of the nominal exchange rate around the levels dened by the CBB. In turn, in the ination targeting regime, the estimated parameters suggest that monetary policy focused on stabilizing ination. 6 In addition, the results suggest a more predictable and systematic behavior on the part of the CBB, reected in the lower variance of monetary policy shocks and a higher degree of interest rate smoothing.
The estimated monetary policy rules lead to very dierent macroeconomic dynamics in response to structural disturbances especially foreign shocks. In particular, the results suggest that the classic role of oating exchange rates namely, buering the eects of those shocks is key to the observed dierences.
These dierences in dynamics under the two monetary regimes make one wonder what would have happened if the transition between them had occurred at a dierent time, under dierent circumstances.
To analyze this question we construct counterfactual histories that simulate how alternative monetary policy congurations would have aected the performance of the Brazilian economy in response to the estimated structural shocks.
Our results suggest that maintaining the currency peg after the rst quarter of 1999 would have been come at a great cost. 7 Although it is always possible to avoid an abrupt exchange rate devaluation in the model, our counterfactual analysis suggests that this would have required extremely high interest rates for several quarters. As a result, economic activity would have contracted sharply. Despite the fact that the model abstracts from some important dimensions, such as scal policy, it seems plausible to conclude that keeping the peg after the rst quarter of 1999 would have been essentially impossible.
In a second counterfactual analysis, we simulate an acceleration of the pace of devaluation of the exchange rate crawling peg after the Asian Crisis, from approximately 7% to 14% per year. In this 6 For recent papers on changes in monetary policy in Brazil since the implementation of the ination targeting regime, see Berriel et al. (2013) , Carvalho et al. (2013) e Gonçalves (2015) . 7 Our evaluation of the costs and benets of alternative histories is deliberately informal and need not coincide with what would be implied by a formal welfare analysis based on the structure of the model. We proceed in this manner to relate the evaluation of dierent alternatives with what we take to be the common sense among participants of this debate in Brazil. case, Brazil would have experienced higher ination, higher nominal and real interest rates, and weaker economic activity.
Finally, results from a third counterfactual simulation suggest that the rst semester of 1998 may have oered the ideal window for a relatively smooth transition from the currency peg rate to the ination targeting regime with a oating exchange rate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains how its solution is cast in a state-space representation. The subsequent section provides details of the methodology and data used to estimate the model. Sections 4 and 5 present results of the estimated model and the simulated counterfactual histories, respectively. The last section concludes. In an attempt to shorten the paper and make it less arid, we defer the technical and methodological details to the Appendix, whenever possible.
Model
Our main reference is the (semi-)small open economy new Keynesian model of Justiniano and Preston (2010) . A representative consumer derives utility and forms habits through the consumption of domestic and imported goods and services (goods or products). She also incurs disutility from supplying labor to domestic producers. In order to smooth consumption, she can resort to domestic bonds that yield the nominal interest rate set by the CBB and to bonds traded abroad, which earn an interest rate determined in the international market plus a premium that depends on Brazil's net foreign asset position.
Firms operate under monopolistic competition and are divided into two groups. Domestic producers employ labor to produce their goods using a technology that is subject to productivity shocks. The other group comprises retail rms that import their products, dierentiate them at no extra cost, and sell them in the domestic market. All rms reevaluate their prices infrequently, and otherwise index their prices to past ination.
The main modication we make to the model is the introduction of two distinct monetary regimes, in the spirit of Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) . In the rst regime, the interest rate dened by the CBB responds to departures of the nominal exchange rate from a target that may evolve over time, interpreted as the center of the exchange rate band specied by the central bank. In the second regime, the CBB responds to deviations of ination from its target, which may also vary over time. Following the approach advocated by Woodford (2003) , we work with the cashless limit of a monetary economy. 
subject to the budget constraint presented below. The Γ t term is a preference shock, H t ≡ hC t−1 is the stock of consumption habits (taken as given by the agent) and N t is labor supply. The parameter β < 1 is the subjective time discount factor, and the parameters σ and ϕ are, respectively, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply.
The operator E t denotes expectations conditional on information available at time t.
Aggregate consumption is given by:
where η is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods and α is the share of imported goods in total consumption a measure of the degree of openness of the economy. C D,t and C I,t are the composites of domestic and imported goods, respectively, obtained through the aggregation of the dierent varieties C D,t (i) e C I,t (i):
The elasticity of substitution between varieties with the same origin is given by ε.
To her dismay, the representative Brazilian consumer faces the following budget constraint:
where S t is the nominal exchange rate, quoted in domestic currency units (Reais) per unit of foreign currency (Dollars), D t are (domestic) bonds denominated in Reais and B t are Dollar-denominated (foreign) bonds with gross interest rates given, respectively, by R t and R * t Φ t ( StBt PtY ), W t is the nominal wage, Π D,t and Π I,t are the prots of domestic producers and importers, respectively, Y is the steadystate level of output, and P t is the price index associated with the consumption aggregator, to be dened below. The consumer also faces a standard no-Ponzi constraint.
The interest rate on foreign bonds B t is given by the combination of the international interest rate R * t and a wedge that depends on Brazil's net foreign asset position, which can be interpreted as a risk premium associated with external indebtedness. This premium is given by the function Φ t ( ): 8
where φ t is a risk-premium shock.
The assumption that the interest rate on foreign bonds depends positively on the level of external indebtedness guarantees the stationarity of the model. 9 Furthermore, it allows us to introduce a shock that is needed for the estimation of the model, and which has the advantage of being interpreted as a deviation from the standard uncovered interest rate parity condition (see below).
The optimal allocation of consumption in each category of goods (domestic and imported) implies the following demands for the aggregate imported and domestic products:
and the following demands for each variety :
The varieties of goods and services are imperfect substitutes, and so rms retain some market power. This is reected in negatively sloped demand curves (equation (1)).
The price indices by product origin are given by:
and the aggregate price index for the domestic economy is given by:
The remaining rst-order conditions for the representative consumer's optimization problem are:
8 We assume that the representative agent takes this risk premium as given when making her consumption and portfolio decisions.
9 For an analysis of alternative ways to induce stationarity in small open economy models, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) .
10 The optimal choices must also satisfy a standard transversality condition.
7 Equation (2) determines the labor supply, and (3) and (4) are standard Euler equations. These last two equations can be combined to obtain a risk-premium-adjusted uncovered interest parity condition:
Domestic producers
There is a continuum of domestic producers operating under monopolistic competition, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each company employs labor to produce a dierentiated good/service y D,t (i). Production technologies are subject to a common productivity shock, given by A t :
For ease of exposition, we denote the real marginal cost, which is the same for all domestic producers, as:
Hence, we can write rm i's prots as:
Firms reoptimize their prices infrequently, as in Calvo (1983) . For each rm, this happens with probability 1 − θ D per period, independently of what happens to other rms. Therefore, in each period a fraction (1−θ D ) of rms reoptimizes their prices, while the remaining fraction (θ D ) follows an indexation rule. Specically, rms that do not reoptimize in period t adjust their previous prices according to:
where the parameter δ D determines the degree of indexation to past ination.
All rms that reoptimize in period t face the same intertemporal problem and chose the same price X D,t (i) = X D,t . Hence, the price index for domestic products evolves according to:
.
Firms sell their products in both the domestic and international markets. We assume that the external demand has the same functional form as the domestic demand (1), so that a rm that reoptimized 8 its price in the period t faces the following sequence of demands:
where C * D,t+τ is the external aggregate demand for domestic products (to be detailed below).
Taking price rigidity into account, a rm selecting the optimal price in period t maximizes the present discounted value of its expected prots:
subject to the sequence of demands given by equation (5),
Uc,t is the nominal discount stochastic factor of the representative consumer. 11
Importing retail rms
Retail rms import goods acquired at prices determined in the international market, and transform them into dierentiated goods to be sold in the domestic market. For simplicity, we assume that this dierentiation is done at no cost. The retail sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, so that each rm has some market power to set prices. These are set in local currency, and are subject to infrequent adjustments and indexation to past ination. This leads to an imperfect passthrough from international prices and nominal exchange rate movements to consumer prices.
All importing rms which re-optimize in period t face the same intertemporal problem and chose the same price X I,t (i) = X I,t . Hence, the aggregate price index for imported goods sold in the domestic market evolves according to:
, where θ I is the price rigidity parameter and δ I is the indexation parameter.
The optimization problem of retail rms is also analogous to that of domestic producers. Subject to the demand sequence C I,t+τ |t = X I,t P I,t+τ
11 Because we assume incomplete markets, the reader who is familiar with this type of model may question the use of the stochastic discount factor for the valuation of future stream of prots. Although arbitrary, this assumption is innocuous, because it does not aect the rst-order approximation of the model that we shall rely on. We would obtain the same results under the assumption that future prots are discounted at the nominal interest rate. 9 rms maximize the present discounted value of expected prots
where P * t is the price of imported products in the international market.
Law of one price, exchange rates and terms of trade
For later use, here we dene some objects of interest. The real exchange rate Q t is given by the ratio between international and domestic prices converted to the same currency:
The terms of trade T oT t are dened as the relative price of Brazil's imports and exports: 12
Lastly, we dene the ratio between international prices converted to Reais and the prices of imported goods in the domestic market:
The variable Ψ I,t measures deviations from the Law of One Price for imported goods. We follow Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) in assuming that monetary policy during the crawling peg regime is described by a standard interest rate rule. More specically, it features the usual responses to ination and economic activity, but is modied to include deviations of the nominal exchange rate from the target specied by the CBB. This allows the CBB to react to exchange rate pressures, and is compatible with the behavior of the nominal exchange rate in that period.
Monetary policy

Ination targeting regime
Monetary policy in the ination targeting regime follows a standard interest rate rule with a small modication. Despite the oating exchange rate, the CBB is allowed to respond to changes in the nominal exchange rate. Other than that, the interest rate responds to economic activity and deviations of ination from its target.
Foreign block
The domestic economy is assumed to be small enough not to aect the world economy. For simplicity, the latter is assumed to evolve according to a rst-order vector autoregressive model (VAR). 14 The 13 The so-called macro-bands continued to exist, but lost any practical relevance.
14 The VAR(1) coecients are estimated separately, and kept xed during the estimation of the DSGE model.
11
variables included in the VAR are output Y * t , ination π * t ≡ log(P * t /P * t−1 ) and the foreign interest rate i * t ≈ log(R * t ). The VAR shocks are denoted by ε * y , ε * π and ε * i .
To allow identication of a foreign monetary shock, we impose the usual Cholesky ordering, with the foreign interest rate placed last. Therefore, the VAR(1) can be described as
where the coecient matrices are
a 1,yy a 1,yπ a 1,yi a 1,πy a 1,ππ a 1,πi a 1,iy a 1,iπ a 1,ii    .
General equilibrium
Equilibrium in the market for domestic goods and services requires equality between domestic production and the sum of domestic consumption and exports:
where we assume that the international demand for domestic products is given by
The equation above reects the assumption, already embbeded in equation (5), that the export prices of domestic products are the same as the prices in the domestic market, converted to foreign currency using the nominal exchange rate for each period.
Additionally, we assume that domestic bonds are in zero net supply, so that D t = 0 for all periods.
The remaining equilibrium conditions are standard.
First-order approximation of the model
As in most of the literature on DSGE models, we work with a rst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady state characterized by zero ination and balanced trade.
The complete set of log-linearized equations is shown in the Appendix. As a general rule, lowercase letters indicate deviations of the respective variables from its steady state value. In most cases, the deviation is logarithmic, but in some cases it is in levels.
Regarding monetary policy, as detailed in Section 2.5 the model species one interest rate rule for each regime. These are the only equations that may vary across regimes. The rule for the crawling peg 12 regime is given by
where π t ≡ log(P t /P t−1 ) e s c,t denotes the exchange rate target. We included an interest rate lag to allow for policy inertia. Finally, ε F X i,t is a shock in the interest rate rule, which can be interpreted as a non-systematic component of monetary policy.
For the ination targeting regime, we dened the rule: 15
where ∆ is the rst-dierence operator and π m,t is the ination target.
Shocks
The model features eight structural shocks 16 ve of them in the domestic economy and three related to the foreign block. The structural shocks related to the domestic economy are related to monetary policy (i), preferences (γ), technology (a), risk premium (φ), and cost of imported goods (cp). 17 The last four shocks follow rst-order autoregressive processes (AR (1)), whereas the domestic monetary policy shock and foreign shocks are assumed to be i.i.d.:
The innovations are cross-sectionally independent i.i.d. N (0, 1).
15 This rule is similar to those found in Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) 
where θ is a vector collecting all structural parameters of the DSGE model, Υ t is a vector containing its variables and t is a vector with the aforementioned structural innovations. Regarding the assumption about expectations formation underlying the representation in (6), recall that the transition between regimes is assumed to be unanticipated.
We solve the model using the method proposed by Sims (2002) , restricting the parameter space to exclude cases with multiple solutions or no (bounded) solution. The unique solution can be represented as:
These equations comprise the reduced-form solution of the model, which takes the form of a VAR(1).
They are the so-called transition equations.
The next step toward estimation of the model is to connect variables in Υ t to observables through so-called observation (or measurement) equations. This completes the state-space representation of the model, composed of transition and observation equations.
The regime-specic transition equations are given by the reduced-form VAR(1) representation of the model (equation 7). The observation equations are the same for both regimes and are given by
where Υ obs t is the vector of observables, to be discussed in Section 3.1.
Given enough structural shocks and measurement errors in the observation equations, the Kalman lter can be used to construct the likelihood function for the vector of observables Υ obs t , for a given vector of parameters θ. 18 3 Estimation
Our model is composed of two sets of equations, one for the crawling peg regime and the other for the ination targeting regime. The goal of the estimation is to extract information from the data about the structural parameters of the economy, grouped into the vector θ, taking into account the change in regime that happened in the beginning of 1999.
In the econometrics literature on structural breaks, a distinction is made between a pure break, 18 See, for example, Hamilton (2004) .
14 in which the whole vector of parameters of interest is subject to change, and a partial break, in which only a few components of the vector of parameters may change. In our model, we face a partial break, because only the parameters referring to the monetary policy rule can vary between regimes. Therefore, we can rewrite the vector θ as
where θ 0 collects the invariant parameters, θ F X groups the parameters associated with the crawling peg regime, and θ IT collects the parameters associated with the ination targeting regime.
One option to estimate this model is to split the sample according to the two monetary regimes and carry out an estimation for each sub-sample. However, this approach is inecient, because it ignores the fact that most parameters are invariant to the regime shift. Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) estimate an analogous DSGE model for Sweden, accounting for the shift from a xed exchange rate regime to an ination targeting regime with oating exchange rates, which took place in that country in the early 1990s. The authors suggest a simple way to account for the regime change and use the whole sample in the estimation, which is then carried out using Bayesian methods. We follow their methodology.
To lighten the exposition, we leave the details of the estimation including specication of the prior distribution of the structural parameters to the Appendix. In summary, the procedure consists 
Data
The vector of observables Υ obs t includes eight series: Domestic GDP, domestic interest rate, domestic ination, terms of trade, nominal exchange rate, foreign GDP, foreign interest rate and foreign ination: We lter the (log) GDP series with the Hodrik-Prescott lte, using a smoothing parameter of 1600.
With the exception of domestic ination and the nominal exchange rate, we extract a log-linear trend from the series. 21 Due to the way they enter the monetary policy rule, there is a complicating factor in using those two variables in the estimation. In the crawling peg regime, the CBB reacts to deviations of the exchange rate from its desired level, while in the ination targeting regime the CBB reacts to deviations of ination from target. However, there is no explicit ination target during the crawling peg regime, as well as no explicit exchange rate target in the ination targeting regime. A possible solution would be to specify the stochastic process for these variables (targets for nominal exchange rate and ination) and treat them as unobservables outside of their respective regimes. For simplicity, we decided not to include them as observables and adjusted the nominal exchange rate and domestic ination series to incorporate this information in an approximate manner.
For the nominal exchange rate, we t a log-linear trend to the center of the exchange rate bands that were in place during the crawling peg regime. We then extrapolate this trend for the whole sample economy, instead of a short-term rate. This is done to avoid the zero lower bound on short-term interest rates and thus be able to extend the sample beyond the end of 2008. The reasons for selecting a 5-
year rate are twofold. Swanson and Williams (2014) show that, even after the Fed had cut the federal funds rate to essentially zero, yields on 5-year (and longer-dated) treasuries continued to respond to macroeconomic surprises in ways that resembled the responses during periods in which interest rates were farther away from zero. Additionally, when we estimate the VAR of the foreign block with the 5-year rate using the pre-2008 sample, we obtain dynamics that are quite similar to a traditional VAR using 3-month interest rates as a measure of i * t . 26
4 Results
Posterior distributions
We are particularly interested in possible dierences in the monetary policy rule associated with each regime, summarized in Table 2. 27 The parameters of the two monetary policy rules reect characteristics that one would expect for the dierent regimes. In the crawling peg regime, we point out the response of the interest rate to deviations of the nominal exchange rate from trend (λ s ), reecting the focus of the CBB on nominal exchange rate stability.
In the ination targeting regime, we highlight the response of interest rates to deviations of ination from target (λ π ), the greater persistence of the interest rate (ρ i,1 e ρ i,2 ), and the smaller magnitude 24 Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) also use this transformation.
25 We also carried out an estimation in which we subtracted the time-series average of ination targets from domestic ination, and results changed only slightly.
26 See Vilela (2014) for more details.
27 In the Appendix we report additional estimation results. It is interesting to point out that the dierences in estimates across regimes are similar to those found by Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) for Sweden. The only exception is the coecient on output, for which Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) found a reduction when moving from a currency peg to the ination targeting regime. In contrast, our estimates point to a market increase in the sensitivity of the interest rate to the level of economic activity in the ination targeting regime. 
Shock propagation
The importance of the monetary policy rule associated with each regime becomes evident when we analyze the impact and propagation of shocks. To do so, we compare impulse response functions across regimes and observe that the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in response to shocks display important quantitative and qualitative dierences. After that, using a variance decomposition, we show that these dierences are also visible in the contribution of each structural shock to the volatility of macroeconomic variables in the model. In all such exercises, we use the mode of the posterior distribution to x the values for the structural parameters. To shorten the exposition, we present results for a few shocks only.
Contractionary domestic monetary policy shock
We start with the eects of domestic monetary policy shocks. It is important to keep in mind that the analysis of these shocks in the crawling peg regime must be done with care. Due to the focus of the CBB in maintaining the nominal exchange rate at an essentially predetermined level, the exogenous increase in the interest rate is almost immediately reversed to bring the exchange rate back to target. In spite of this fact, the exercise is useful to illustrate the transmission of shocks in the economy. regimes. In each case the innovation is equivalent to one standard deviation (i.e., the value of σ i in each regime). For most variables, the pattern of the response is similar in qualitative terms. In response to a monetary tightening, the exchange rate increases in nominal and real terms, and the various ination measures decline. Output decreases as consumption and net exports contract. However, it is important to point out that there are meaningful quantitative dierences across regimes, with signicantly stronger responses in the ination targeting regime. These dierences do not stem from the size of the shock, which is larger in the crawling peg regime (see Table 2 ), but from the way in which shocks are propagated in each regime.
Contractionary foreign monetary policy shock
The eects of a contractionary foreign monetary policy shock are shown in Figure 3 . In this case, there is pressure for the domestic currency to depreciate. In the crawling peg regime, we see a marked increase in the interest rate set by the CBB, in an attempt to keep the nominal exchange rate close to the desired level. This causes a reduction in consumption and GDP. In the ination targeting regime, the role of oating exchange rates as shock absorbers already pointed out by Friedman (1966) is quite visible. Indeed, results show a relatively muted response of 20 the domestic interest rate, GDP, ination and consumption. This relative stability contrasts with the greater depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates relative to the crawling peg regime.
A slightly counterintuitive result is the increase in domestic GDP under the ination targeting regime in response to a foreign monetary policy tightening. Monacelli (2004) argues that, under a oating exchange rate, a monetary contraction originated abroad can be transmitted by two channels with opposing signs. One of them operates through depreciation of the domestic currency and an increase in net exports. The other channel is through a decrease in foreign aggregated demand, which reduces demand for exports. In our estimated model, the rst eect dominates.
Risk premium shock
Risk premium shocks exert strong pressure on the nominal exchange rate. Due to the dierent monetary policy rules, the eects of this type of shock are also dierent across regimes (Figure 4) . As a general statement, the eects of this shock resemble an amplied version of the eects of a contractionary foreign monetary policy shock.
In the crawling peg regime, the immediate eect of an increase in the risk premium is a sharp increase in the interest rates to mitigate the pressure for an exchange rate depreciation. Despite the fact that imported goods ination is contained, the contractionary eects of policy tightening manifest themselves in the drop of consumption and domestic ination. As a result of the contraction of domestic absorption and the slight real exchange rate depreciation, net exports increase. However, this result is insucient to make up for the fall in consumption, and as a result there is a signicant drop in GDP.
In the ination targeting regime, an increase in the risk premium leads to a sharp exchange rate depreciation. As in the crawling peg regime, the real interest rate increases and leads to a drop in consumption. The same occurs with domestic goods ination. However, these movements are much smaller than in the crawling peg regime. In contrast, imported goods ination increases much more in the ination targeting regime . This is due to the strong devaluation of the exchange rate. As a result, net exports increase signicantly. The net eect is an increase in GDP.
Productivity shock
Finally, we analyze the eects of a positive productivity shock ( Figure 5 ). In this case there is also a marked dierence across the two monetary regimes. In both cases, an increase in productivity leads to a drop in domestic goods ination. However, in the crawling peg regime, the focus in the stability of the nominal exchange rate induces devaluation of the real exchange rate, and stimulates net exports.
In the ination targeting regime, the nominal exchange rate strengthens signicantly, despite the larger drop in the interest rate. As a result, imported goods ination falls, the real exchange rate appreciates, and net exports fall slightly. In summary, an increase in productivity leads to an expansion of economic activity in both regimes, but the split between consumption and net exports is dierent.
Variance decomposition
The impulse response functions presented before allow us to visualize the way in which the eects of individual shocks propagate across the two regimes. A variance decomposition exercise allows us to evaluate the relative importance of each shock for aggregate uctuations in each monetary regime.
In the Appendix we present variance decompositions for a few forecast horizons (Tables 4 and 5) .
For the sake of brevity, here we focus on a few variables only, and concentrate our analysis on foreign shocks ( y * , π * and i * ) and on the risk premium shock ( φ ).
The Each monetary policy regime is associated with a dierent state-space representation. The counterfactual histories are constructed by feeding the estimated shocks for a given time window using the state-space representation of interest. We can then simulate the path that the economy would have followed under monetary policies other than the one that actually prevailed at that time.
In a model with rational expectations, generating counterfactual histories requires well dened laws of motion for the nominal exchange rate and ination targets, so that agents can incorporate those in their information set and form expectations accordingly. Therefore, we append to the model stochastic processes that govern the movement of the center of the exchange rate band and the ination target which were not explicitly included in the estimation of the model (see Section 3.1).
Specically, we assume that changes in the nominal exchange rate target follow an AR(1) process:
∆s c,t = ρ sc ∆s c,t−1 + σ sc sc,t .
We make the same assumption for the evolution of the ination target: π m,t = ρ πm π m,t−1 + σ πm πm,t .
28 The reader who is not familiar with this type of exercise may nd it useful to think of the procedure as being analogous to the recovery of residuals in an ordinary least squares regression (that is, the dierence between the data and what the estimated regression would produce in the absence of innovations). The dierence is here the procedure requires that we take into account the whole (dynamic) structure of the model. Precisely because of this structure, these recovered shocks (residuals) have specic economic interpretations as opposed to residuals produced by purely statistical models. Another issue pertains to the fact that we use a Bayesian framework. We could recover several shock histories, associated with several combinations of structural parameters (whose posterior distribution we estimated). For simplicity and brevity, we chose to select only one vector of structural parameter values as our point estimates (the global mode of the posterior distribution), and recover the associated structural shocks. Hence, despite the Bayesian approach, our strategy for constructing counterfactual histories has a frequentist nature.
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The parameters ρ sc , σ sc , ρ πm and σ πm can be used to calibrate the desired counterfactual experiments.
For our purposes, it is enough to set ρ sc = ρ πm = 0.999 and only calibrate the scale of shocks (σ sc and σ πm ).
With this extension of the estimated model we can simulate, for example, a delay in the adoption of the ination targeting regime with oating exchange rates. This requires specication of the evolution of the target for the nominal exchange rate past the rst quarter of 1999, in a way that allows agents to form (rational) expectations. The addition of the stochastic processes for the nominal exchange rate band and ination targets to the model fullls this role. Figure 6 shows the smoothed structural innovations. One way to assess the plausibility of results is to compare estimates with objective measures of the economic objects of interest that were not used in the estimation. Figure 7 shows the (standardized) series of the risk premium produced by the estimated model and sovereign risk as measured by JP Morgan's EMBI+ Brazil.
29 The correlation between the two series is 0.89, which suggests that the estimated model accounts well for the underlying economic environment. Figure 9 simulates the eects of a faster pace of exchange rate devaluation in the crawling peg regime.
Faster devaluation of the exchange rate bands
We assume a pace of devaluation of 14% p.a., starting after the Asian Crisis (i.e., as of the last quarter of 1997). We keep the switch to ination targeting in the rst quarter of 1999.
Our simulations indicate that this policy would have produced more ination, higher nominal and real interest rates, and slightly lower economic activity, as the increase in net exports induced by the additional real exchange rate depreciation would prove insucient to make up for the drop in consumption caused by the increase in the real interest rate. Notice that, as in the previous experiment, this counterfactual history still features a sharp devaluation of Real in the rst quarter of 1999. This is due to the fact that the structural shocks estimated are still acting in the same manner, independently of the monetary/exchange rate regime in place. In particular, the large risk premium shock estimated for that moment continues to exert strong pressure for the devaluation of the exchange rate, which is translated in an actual devaluation in all counterfactual simulations in which the shift to the ination targeting regime occurs before the rst quarter of 1999.
6 Conclusion
The specication of a DSGE model that satisfactorily captures the dynamics of an economy of interest is not a trivial task. This is especially true when dealing with emerging economies, which have a history of vulnerability to foreign factors and recurring periods of macroeconomic instability. In the case of Brazil, all these elements are present, even in the period after the implementation of the Real Plan. This might be the main reason why most of the DSGE models estimated for the Brazilian economy use samples that cover the ination targeting regime only.
In this paper, we estimate a DSGE model for Brazil using a sample that covers both the crawling peg and the ination targeting with oating exchange rate regimes. To do so, we explicitly model the As we emphasized in more than one occasion, our results are subject to a series of important caveats.
The main one, in our opinion, is the fact that the model abstracts from the scal dimension. As an example of a possible implication of this simplication, observe that our estimation recovers a series of exogenous risk premium shocks that inevitably exert pressure for the devaluation of the Real in the rst quarter of 1999. However, it can be argued that this shock is somewhat endogenous, since the risk premium observed in this and other episodes reect scal sustainability concerns. Additionally, the sharp devaluation in January 1999 was inuenced by a loss of international reserves caused by interventions in the foreign exchange market to defend the crawling peg regime, and, for a short period of time, the so-called endogenous diagonal band. 32
With relevant modications to the model, the estimated structural shocks could change signicantly.
32 Between abandoning the crawling peg and oating the Real, the CBB tried to implement a new crawling peg regime.
The so-called endogenous diagonal band would be devalued at a pace that would depend on the behavior of the nominal exchange rate within the band. More specically, the pace of devaluation would be faster when the exchange rate was closer to the bottom end of the band (i.e., stronger), and slower when the exchange rate was closer to the upper end of the band (i.e., weaker). This exchange rate arrangement lasted for two days.
As a result, it is possible that the counterfactual simulations would come out dierent. For example, with a model that relates the risk premium to scal policy, it is possible that the estimated exogenous shocks would change substantially and that the inevitable devaluation in the rst quarter of 1999 would disappear. This is an interesting question for future research.
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-Relationship between ination and terms of trade π t = π D,t + α∆tot t .
-Budget constraint
-Uncovered interest rate parity
-Monetary policy rules -Crawling peg regime
-Ination targeting regime
-Structural shocks a t = ρ a a t−1 + σ a a,t ,
ε r i,t = σ i,r i,t , r = F X, IT, ε y * ,t = σ y * y * ,t , ε π * ,t = σ π * π * ,t , ε i * ,t = σ i * i * ,t .
The innovations are i.i.d. N (0, 1) and mutually independent.
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A.2 Details of the estimation We estimate the model using Bayesian methods. The main steps of the estimation are briey discussed
below. An and Schorfheide (2007) , Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) and Guerron-Quintana and Nason (2013) provide a detailed exposition of these methods and an encompassing survey of developments in this area.
The goal of the Bayesian estimation is to characterize the posterior distribution P (θ| Υ obs T t ) of the DSGE model parameters θ conditional on the observed sample Υ obs T t . To that end, we exploit the fact that the posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood function of the DSGE model L( Υ obs T t |θ), multiplied by the prior distribution P (θ) of the parameters: 
A.2.1 Kalman lter with change in regime
To incorporate the change in regime in the estimation we use the approach proposed by Cúrdia and Finocchiaro (2013) . The starting point is to rewrite the posterior distribution, explicitly considering the sub-samples of each monetary policy regime: 
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We start the recursive procedure by applying the Kalman lter to the state-space representation corresponding to the crawling peg regime, reproduced below:
Given the assumption of normality of exogenous shocks t , for each time period we have:
where µ t (θ) and Σ t (θ) are, respectively, the mean and conditional variance of Υ obs t , calculated using the Kalman lter.
The procedure begins with the attribution of initial conditions for the state vector Υ t . For the mean Υ 0|0 , we use a vector of zeros. For the variance P 0|0 , we use the unconditional variance of Υ t . We then iterate the recursion of the Kalman lter forward, until the last period of the crawling peg regime.
Formally:
where u t are the one-step-ahead prediction errors:
In each period, we compute the forecast error and the log-likelihood function according to:
where:
At the end of the recursion, we calculate the log-likelihood of the sub-sample corresponding to the crawling peg regime:
In the transition to the sample period which corresponds to the ination targeting regime, the initial state of the economy used in the recursion corresponds to the last state in the crawling peg regime.
Thus, for the mean we use the state vector of the last period of the crawling peg regime and for the variance we used the associated P t matrix.
With the initial state dened, we can proceed recursively, in a manner that is analogous to what we did for the crawling peg regime, but using the space-state representation associated with the ination targeting regime. Therefore, from this period forward, we have:
Finally, at the end of the recursion we compute the log-likelihood of the sub-sample corresponding to the ination targeting regime, obtained in an analogous manner to that described for the previous regime:
A.2.2 Prior distribution
A detailed desciption of the choice of priors for the structural parameters can be found in Carvalho and Vilela (2015) . For brevity, here we only summarize those choices in Table 3 . However, for completeness, we comment on parameters that are calibrated.
Following de Castro et al. (2011), the time-discount factor (β) is set to 0.989. 36 The (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply (ϕ −1 ) is set to 1.0. Finally, the parameter α, which can be interpreted as the degree of openness of the economy, is set to 0.25, corresponding to the ratio between gross trade ows and GDP over the sample period.
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36 Here there should be a restriction relating β with foreign interest rate and ination in the steady state (see Carvalho and Vilela (2015) , Section A.1.3). However, we decided not to impose this restriction, estimate the foreign block separately, and calibrate the time-discount factor in conformity with the SAMBA model.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties (ε) does not show up in the log-linear approximation of the model, and hence it does not aect its estimation. Due to the change in monetary regime, the use of the standard Kalman smoother does not correctly recover the structural shocks in our model. This happens because the standard algorithm assumes a single state-space representation for the entire sample. To solve this problem, we use the shocks recovered with the standard smoother as initial estimates of the true structural shocks. We then use these estimates as initial guesses for an optimization algorithm, used to minimize the distance between the series simulated by propagating the shocks through the model and the observed data. 
